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The objective of this paper is to develop a new solution methodology for matrix games, in which goals
are viewed as intuitionistic fuzzy sets (IFSs) and the elements of the pay-off matrix are represented by
triangular intuitionistic fuzzy numbers (TIFNs). In this methodology, a suitable ranking function is
deﬁned to establish an order relation between two TIFNs, and the concept of intuitionistic fuzzy (I-fuzzy)
inequalities is interpreted. Utilizing these inequality relations and ranking functions, a pair of linear
programming models is derived from a pair of auxiliary intuitionistic fuzzy programming models. Based
on the aspiration levels, this pair of linear programming models is solved to determine the optimal
strategies for both players of the game. The proposed method in this paper is illustrated with a voting
share problem to demonstrate the validity and applicability of the method.
Copyright © 2016, Far Eastern Federal University, Kangnam University, Dalian University of Technology,
Kokushikan University. Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC
BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Introduction
In traditional game theory, the precise assessment information
is difﬁcult due to a lack of information about the exact values of
certain parameters and the fuzzy understanding of various situa-
tions by players. Fuzzy set theory, which is a very useful tool in
game theory, has achieved a substantial amount of success. (Cam-
pos [9], Nishizaki and Sakawa [27,28], Bector and Chandra [8],
Nayak and Pal [21,22], Li [14,16], Vidyottama and Chandra [37],
Vijay et al. [38,39], Liu and Kao [18], Cevikel and Ahlatcioglu [10],
Kacher and Larbani [12], Seikh et al. [32,33]). However, a fuzzy set
only employs a membership degree. The degree of non-
membership is automatically equal to the complement to 1: In
real situations, however, players/decision makers often do not ex-
press the degree of non-membership as the complement to 1:
Players/decision makers may exhibit some degree of hesitation.
Therefore, a fuzzy set has no means of incorporating a degree of
hesitation.), prasunkrnayak@gmail.com
Federal University, Kangnam
an University.
ersity, Kangnam University, Dalian
C-ND license (http://creativecommThe intuitionistic fuzzy set (IFS), which is a generalization of
fuzzy set theory, was introduced by Atanassov [4,5]; it is suitable for
solving problems concerning vagueness. An IFS is characterized by
two functionsda function that expresses the degree of member-
ship and a function that expresses the degree of non-member-
shipdthus, the sum of both values is less than or equal to 1. The
degree of hesitation is equal to one minus the sum of the degree of
membership and the degree of non-membership. Therefore, the
concept of the IFS is considered to be an alternative approach for
deﬁning a fuzzy set in cases where available information is insuf-
ﬁcient for deﬁning an imprecise concept by conventional fuzzy sets.
Therefore, an IFS can be employed to simulate the human decision-
making process and any activity that requires human expertise and
knowledge, which are inevitably imprecise or not completely reli-
able. Atanassov [6] discussed an open problem about the inter-
pretation of an IFS in different optimization problems. Angelov [3]
was the ﬁrst researcher to answer this problem by implementing
an optimization technique in an intuitionistic fuzzy environment.
However, an IFS can be applied to game problems as the players
have some degree of hesitation about appropriate pay-off values
and the selection of a strategy for each of the pay-offs.
Intuitionistic fuzziness in matrix games is generally applied
using two methods: in the ﬁrst method, players have I-fuzzy
goals; in the second method, the elements of the pay-off matrixUniversity of Technology, Kokushikan University. Production and hosting by Elsevier
ons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
Fig. 1. Triangular intuitionistic fuzzy number.
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et al. [30]). Recent studies have focused on the application of an
IFS to resolve game problems. Atanassov [6] described a game
problem using an IFS. Li and Nan [17] developed a nonlinear
programming approach to matrix games with pay-offs of Ata-
nassov's IFS. Aggarwal et al. [1,2] extended the duality results for
two-person zero-sum matrix games with fuzzy goals and fuzzy
pay-offs to an I-fuzzy scenario. Nan et al. [20] implemented a
lexicographic method for matrix games in which pay-offs are
represented by TIFNs. Li et al. [15] employed a bi-objective pro-
gramming approach to solve a matrix game with pay-offs of
TIFNs. Bandyopadhyay et al. [7] solved matrix games with intui-
tionistic fuzzy pay-offs using a score function. Nan and Li [19]
outlined a linear programming approach to solve matrix games
with I-fuzzy goals. Seikh et al. [31,34,36] investigated matrix
games in which goals are represented as an IFS or elements of a
pay-off matrix are represented by TIFNs. Nayak and Pal [23,24]
constructed auxiliary linear programming models to solve bi-
matrix games with goals expressed by an IFS. Seikh et al.
[29,35] applied TIFNs to bi-matrix games. No study has investi-
gated matrix games with I-fuzzy goals and I-fuzzy pay-offs. In
this paper, a new methodology, in which goals are represented as
an IFS and elements of a pay-off matrix are represented by TIFNs,
is introduced to solve matrix games. The idea of double I-fuzzy
inequalities, i.e., the I-fuzzy inequalities and the parameters that
are represented by I-fuzzy numbers, is outlined. The concept of
TIFNs and their arithmetic operations and cut sets are recalled. A
new order relation is proposed to rank the two TIFNs. A pair of
linear programming models is derived from a pair of auxiliary I-
fuzzy programming models using these ranking order relations.
These two models are solved by aspiration levels, and the optimal
strategies for both players are obtained.
The paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, some deﬁnitions
and preliminaries about an IFS and TIFNs are recalled and a ranking
function is deﬁned to establish an order relation between two
TIFNs. Section 3 describes the application of an IFS in optimization
and the concept of double I-fuzzy constraint conditions. The main
problem about the matrix games with I-fuzzy goals and I-fuzzy
pay-offs is formulated in Section 4. The solution procedure of these
games is conceptualized by the degree of acceptance and the de-
gree of rejection of the I-fuzzy aspiration levels for two players. The
results are illustrated by considering a voting share problem in
Section 5. Section 6 reﬂects the conclusions of this paper.
2. Deﬁnitions and preliminaries
2.1. Intuitionistic fuzzy sets
The intuitionistic fuzzy set, which was introduced by Atanassov
[5], is characterized by two functions that express the degree of
belongingness and the degree of non-belongingness.
Deﬁnition 1. Let U ¼ fx1; x2;/; xng be a ﬁnite universal set. The
Atanassov's intuitionistic fuzzy set (IFS) bA in a given universal set U
is an object with the form
bA ¼ nDx; mbAðxÞ; gbAðxÞEx2Uo (1)
where the functions mbA : U/½0;1 and gbA : U/½0;1 deﬁne the
degree of membership and the degree of non-membership,
respectively, of an element x2U to the set A4U such that they
satisfy the following conditions:
0  mbAðxÞ þ nbAðxÞ  1; c x2Uwhich is known as an intuitionistic condition. The degree of
acceptance mbAðxÞ and the degree of non-acceptance nbAðxÞ can be
arbitrary.
Deﬁnition 2. Let bA and bB be two IFSs in the set U. Then, the
intersection of bA and bB are deﬁned as follows:
2.2. Triangular intuitionistic fuzzy number (TIFN)
In this section, the deﬁnitions are derived from Li [13].
Deﬁnition 3. (TIFN) The TIFN ~a¼ h(al, a, ar); wa, ua i is a convex IFS
on the set < of real numbers with al < a< ar , whose membership
function and non-membership function are deﬁned as
m~aðxÞ ¼
8>>>>><>>>>>:
wa
x al
a al
: if al  x< a
wa : if x ¼ a
wa
ar  x
ar  a : if a< x  ar
0 : if x< al or x> ar
(2)
and
n~aðxÞ ¼
8>>>>><>>>>>:
a xþ ðx alÞua
a al
: if al  x< a
ua : if x ¼ a
x aþ ðar  xÞua
ar  a : if a< x  ar
1 : if x< al or x> ar
(3)
as depicted in Fig. 1.
The values wa and ua represent the maximum degree of mem-
bership and the minimum degree of non-membership, respec-
tively, such that they satisfy the following conditions:
0  wa  1,0  ua  1 and 0 wa þ ua  1. Let p~a
(x) ¼ 1mea(x)n~a(x), which is referred to as the I-fuzzy index of an
element x in the TIFNa. It is the degree of indeterminacy mem-
bership of the element x to the TIFN ea.
If mea(x)þn~a(x)¼ 1c x2 U, then ~a¼ h(al, a, ar); wa, ua i is reduced
to ~a ¼ h (al, a, ar); wa,1 e wa i, which is a triangular fuzzy number
(TFN). The deﬁnition of a TIFN is a generalization of the deﬁnition of
the TFN, which was introduced by Dubois and Prade [11]. Two new
parametersdwa and uadare introduced to reﬂect the conﬁdence
level of a TIFN and the non-conﬁdence level of a TIFN, respectively.
Therefore, a TIFN may express more uncertainty compared with a
TFN. The set of all TIFNs is denoted by ~F(<).
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denoted by ~a ¼ h (al, a, ar); wa, ua i and ~b ¼ h (bl, b,br); wb, ubi; the
arithmetic operations are deﬁned as follows:
Addition:
~aþ ~b ¼ hða1 þ b1; aþ b; ar þ brÞ; minfwa;wbg; maxfua;ubgi:
Subtraction:
~a ~b ¼ hða1  br; a b; ar  b1Þ; minfwa;wbg; maxfua;ubgi:
Scalar Multiplication:
k~a ¼
 hðkal; ka; karÞ;wa;uaiif k>0
hðkar; ka; kalÞ;wa;uaiif k<0 ;where k is a real number:
Definition 5. (Cut sets of TIFNs) For any a2 [0,wa], the a-cut set
of TIFN ea¼ hðal;a; arÞ;wa;uai can be expressed as a crisp subset of <,
which is denoted by ~aa ¼ {xj m~a(x)  a, x 2 < }. According to the
deﬁnition of the TIFN, ~aa is a closed interval denoted by
~aa ¼ [La(~a),Ra(~a)]. From (2),
½Lað~aÞ;Rað~aÞ ¼

al þ
aða alÞ
wa
; ar  aðar  aÞwa

:
Similarly, for any b 2[ua,1], a b-cut set of the TIFN
~a ¼ hðal;a; arÞ;wa;uai can be expressed as a crisp subset of <, as
denoted by ~ab ¼ {xjn~a(x) b, x2 < }. ~ab is a closed interval denoted
by ~ab ¼ ½Lbð~aÞ;Rbð~aÞ: From (3),h
Lbð~aÞ;Rbð~aÞ
i
¼
ð1 bÞaþ ðb uaÞal
1 ua ;
ð1 bÞaþ ðb uaÞar
1 ua

:
In the next context, we discuss the value index and ambiguity
index of a TIFN.
Definition 6. Let ~aa¼ [La(~a), Ra(~a)] and ~ab¼ [Lb(~a), Rb(~a)] be any a-
cut set and a b-cut set, respectively, of the TIFN
~a ¼ hðal;a; arÞ;wa;uai. Then, the values of the membership function
and non-membership function are deﬁned as.
Dmð~aÞ ¼
Zwa
0
Lað~aÞ þ Rað~aÞ
2
f ðaÞda
and Dvð~aÞ ¼
Z 1
ua
Lbð~aÞ þ Rbð~aÞ
2
gðbÞdb. where f (a) is a non-
negative and non-decreasing function on the interval [0, wa],
which should satisfy the conditions f(0) ¼ 0 and
Z wa
0
f ðaÞda ¼ wa:
g(b) is a non-negative and non-increasing function on the interval
[ua,1], which should satisfy the conditions g(1) ¼ 0 andZ 1
ua
gðbÞdb ¼ 1 ua. The functions f(a) and g(b) may be considered
as weighting functions and are expressed as
f ðaÞ ¼ 2a
wa
;a2½0;wa (4)
And
gðbÞ ¼ 2ð1 bÞ
1 ua ; b2½ua;1 (5)
Thus, the values of membership function and non-membership
function of the TIFN ea ¼ hðal;a; arÞ;wa;uai are calculated as follows:Dmð~aÞ¼
Zwa
0

alþ
aðaalÞ
wa
þaraðaraÞwa

a
wa
da¼ðalþ4aþarÞ
6
wa
(6)
and
Dnð~aÞ¼
Z1
ua
ð1bÞaþðbuaÞal
1ua þ
ð1bÞaþðbuaÞar
1ua

1b
1uadb
¼ðalþ4aþarÞ
6
ð1uaÞ
(7)
Dm(~a) and Dn(~a) reﬂect information about the membership degrees
and non-membership degrees.
Similarly, the ambiguities of the membership function and non-
membership function for any TIFN a are deﬁned by
Emð~aÞ ¼
Zwa
0
½Rað~aÞ  Lað~aÞf ðaÞda
and Evð~aÞ ¼
Z 1
ua
½Rbð~aÞ  Lbð~aÞgðbÞdb; respectively. Ra(~a)La(~a) and
Rb(~a)Lb(~a) represent the length of the interval ~aa and the length of
the interval ~ab, respectively. Therefore, Em(~a) and En(~a) represent the
measure of uncertainty in ea.
Using (4) and (5), the ambiguities of the membership function
and the non-membership function of a TIFN ea are calculated as
Emð~aÞ ¼

aral
3

wa and Evð~aÞ ¼

aral
3

ð1 uaÞ
Proposition 1. Let ~a ¼hðal;a; arÞ;wa;uai and ~b ¼ hðbl;b; brÞ;wb;ubi
be any two TIFNs with wa¼wb, ua¼ ub and let k be any non-
negative real number. Then, the following equalities are valid.
(i) Dm(k~a þ ~b) ¼ kDm(~a) þ Dm(~b)
(ii) Dn(k~a þ ~b) ¼ kDn(~a) þ Dn(~b)
(iii) Em(k~a þ ~b) ¼ kEm(~a) þ Em(~b)
(iv) Ev(k~a þ ~b) ¼ kEn(~a) þ En(~b).Definition 7. (Value index and ambiguity index) The value index
and ambiguity index of any TIFN ~a are deﬁned as follows:
value index Vlð~aÞ ¼ lDnð~aÞ þ ð1 lÞDmð~aÞ
and
ambiguity index Alð~aÞ ¼ lEmð~aÞ þ ð1 lÞEnð~aÞ;
where l 2 [0,1] represents the weight of the preference informa-
tion about the players/decision makers (DMs). l 2 [0, 1=2 ) in-
dicates the pessimistic attitude of the players/DMs towards
uncertainty; l 2( 1=2,1] indicates the optimistic attitude of the
players/DMs towards uncertainty, where l ¼ 1=2 shows that
players/DMs have indifferent attitude. Thus, the value index and
ambiguity index may reﬂect the attitudes of the players/DMs about
the TIFNs.
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wb;ubi be any two TIFNs with wa¼wb and ua¼ ub. Then, for any
real number k2 <, the following equalities are valid:
(i) Vl (k~a þ ~b) ¼ kVl(~a) þ Vl(~b)
(ii) Al(k~a þ ~b) ¼ kAl(~a) þ Al(~b).
In the following deﬁnitions, a ranking function is deﬁned based
on the difference between the value index and the ambiguity index
to obtain an order relation between two TIFNs.
Definition 8. A ranking function (or defuzziﬁcation function) is
the function F: ~F(<)/<, where ~F(<) is a set of all TIFNs that are
deﬁned on <, which maps each TIFN into a real line. Let ea be a TIFN.
Then, Fl(~a) ¼ Vl(~a)Al(~a), where l 2 [0,1].
Assume that ~a and ~b be twoTIFNs and l2 [0,1] be any real number.
Then, a new order relation between ~a and eb is deﬁned as follows:
(i) ~a7I:F~biff Flð~aÞ  Flð~bÞ
(ii) ~adI:F~biff Flð~aÞ  Flð~bÞ
(iii) ~a ~¼I:F~biff Flð~aÞ ¼ Flð~bÞ
The symbol ‘7 I.F’ is an intuitionistic fuzzy version of the order
relation ‘’ on the set of real numbers and has the linguistic
interpretation as ‘essentially less than or equal to’. Similarly, the
symbols ‘d I.F’ and ‘e¼I.F’ are the intuitionistic fuzzy versions of the
order relations ‘’ and ‘¼’ on the set of real numbers and have the
linguistic interpretations ‘essentially greater than or equal to’ and
‘essentially equal to’, respectively.
This proposed ranking method satisﬁes axioms, namely, the
reasonable properties proposed by Wang and Kerre [40].
Proposition 3. Let ~a and ~b be any two TIFNs. Then, for any real
number k, the following equality holds
Fl

k~aþ ~b
	
¼ kFlð~aÞ þ Fl

~b
	
:
This shows that the proposed ranking function is linear for these
types of TIFNs.Fig. 2. Membership and non-membership functions for the statement x dp0, q0 a.3. Application of IFS to optimization model
Any optimization model includes objective(s) and constraints.
Intuitionistic fuzzy optimization (IFO), is an extension of fuzzy
optimization, in which the degree of rejection of objective(s) and
constraints are considered with the degree of satisfaction (refer to
Angelov [3], Nayak and Pal [24]). Let U be the universal set. Let Gi,
i ¼ 1,2,…,r, be the set of r goals and Cj, j ¼ 1,2,…,m, be the set of m
constraints, each of which can be characterized by an IFS on U. The
I-fuzzy decision D¼ (G1 ∩ G2 ∩… ∩ Gr)∩(C1 ∩ C2 ∩… ∩ Cm) is an IFS
deﬁned as D ¼ {hx;mDðxÞ; vDðxÞjx 2Ui}, where
mD(x) ¼ min
i;j
fmGiðxÞ;mCjðxÞg and nD(x) ¼ max
i;j
fnGiðxÞ; nCjðxÞg
According to IFO theory, we can maximize the degree of
acceptance of the IF objective(s) and the constraints to minimize
the degree of rejection of the IF objective(s) and constraints. Let x, h
denote the minimal degree of acceptance and the maximal degree
of rejection, respectively, of the objective(s) and constraints. Then,
the I-fuzzy optimization problem is transformed into the following
crisp optimization modeldAngelov [3]das
Subject to
maxfx hg
x  mGiðxÞ; i ¼ 1;2;…; r
h  vGiðxÞ; i ¼ 1;2;…r
x  mCjðxÞ; j ¼ 1;2;…m
h  vCjðxÞ; j ¼ 1;2;…m
x  h;xþ h  1; x;h  0
(8)which can be easily solved by various mathematical programming
methods.
In the following context, we provide an interpretation of
inequality relations in an I-fuzzy environment.3.1. Interpretation of I-fuzzy inequalities
Let x, a2 < and let p0, q0 (>0)2 <. Then the intuitionistic fuzzy
statement ‘xd p0,q0 a’ to be read as “ x is essentially greater than or
equal to a with tolerances p0 and q0” is expressed in terms of the
following membership and non-membership functions (depicted
in Fig 2):
m1ðxÞ ¼
8>><>>:
1; x  a
1 ða xÞ
p0
; ða p0Þ< x< a
0; x  ða p0Þ
and
v1ðxÞ ¼
8>><>>:
1; x  a
1þ ða p0  xÞ
q0
; ða p0Þ< x< ða p0 þ q0Þ
0; x  ða p0 þ q0Þ
The DM is completely satisﬁed if x  a and the tolerances p0, q0
exist, in which the DM is partially satisﬁed, i.e., for
(ap0) < x < (ap0 þ q0), the sum of the degrees of acceptance and
the degree of rejection is less than or equal to one. He/she will not
be satisﬁed if x  (ap0). According to the IFO technique described
in the I-fuzzy inequality relation ‘xd p0,q0, a’ is expressed as
x1  1
a x
p0
and h1  1þ
a p0  x
q0
i:e:; x  a p0ð1 x1Þ and x  ða p0Þ þ q0ð1 h1Þ;
where x1 and h1 denote the minimal degree of acceptance and the
maximal degree of rejection, respectively, that satisfy the condi-
tions 0  x1  1 and 0  h1  1.
Similarly, the I-fuzzy statement ‘x7 r0, s0 a’ to be read as “x is
essentially less than or equal to a with tolerances r0 and s0” is
expressed in terms of the following membership and non-
membership functions:
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8>><>>:
1; x  a
1þ ða xÞ
r0
; a< x< ðaþ r0Þ
0; x  ðaþ r0Þ
and
v2ðxÞ ¼
8>><>>:
1; x  ðaþ r0Þ
1 ðaþ r0  xÞ
s0
; ðaþ r0  s0Þ< x< ðaþ r0Þ
0; x  ðaþ r0  s0Þ
The DM is completely satisﬁed if x  a and the tolerances r0 and
s0 exist, in which the DM is partially satisﬁed, i.e., for
(a þ r0 e s0) < x < (a þ r0), the sum of the degree of acceptance and
the degree of rejection is less than or equal to one. He/she will not
be satisﬁed if x (aþ r0). In a similar manner, the I-fuzzy inequality
relations x7 r0, s0 a is expressed as
x  aþ r0ð1 x2Þ and x  ðaþ r0Þ  s0ð1 h2Þ
where 0  x2  1 and 0  h2  1.3.2. Interpretation of double I-fuzzy constraints
In this subsection, the concept of double I-fuzzy inequalities, i.e.,
the I-fuzzy constraints that involve I-fuzzy numbers, is interpreted.
Based on the resolution method that was proposed in the previous
section, we extend the interpretation of I-fuzzy inequalities to the
case in which the parameters and the adequacies are also I-fuzzy
numbers. Let ~S,~B and ~C be the m  n matrix, the m  1 vector and
the n  1 vector with entries from ~F(<) and the double I-fuzzy
constraints under consideration be expressed as ~S X dI:F
~p;~q
~B and
~S
T
Y7I:F
~p;~q
~C, with the adequacies/tolerances ~p, ~q and ~r, es, respectively,
which are also I-fuzzy vectors. Therefore, the double I-fuzzy
constraint conditions are expressed as
~SXdI:F
~p;~q
~B0
8><>:
~SjXd
I:F ~Bj  epjð1 x1Þ; 0  x1  1
~SjXd
I:F

~Bj  epjþ eqjð1 h1Þ; 0  h1  1 (9)
~S
T
Y7I:F
~r;~s
~C0
(
~SiY7
I:F ~Ci þ ~rið1 x2Þ; 0  x2  1
~SiY7
I:F

~Ci þ ~ri
	
 ~sið1 h2Þ; 0  h2  1
(10)
where i ¼ 1,2,…,m and j ¼ 1,2,…, n.dI:F and7I:F are the relations
between two I-fuzzy numbers, which preserve the ranking when I-
fuzzy numbers are multiplied by positive scalars. ~pj and ~qj (j ¼ 1, 2
…, n) represent the jth component of the I-fuzzy vectors ~p and~q,
respectively. Similarly, ~ri and ~si (i ¼ 1,2, …,m) represent the ith
component of I-fuzzy vectors er and ~s, respectively.
4. Mathematical model of a matrix game
Let {1, 2,…, m} be the set of pure strategies that are available to
player I and let {1,2, …,n} be the set of pure strategies that are
available for player II. When player I chooses the pure strategy i and
player II chooses the pure strategy j, then aij is a payoff for player I
and aij is a payoff for player II. The two-person zero-sum matrix
game G can be represented as a pay-off matrix, Owen [26]A ¼
B1 B2 / Bn
A1
A2
«
Am
0BB@
a11 a12 / a1n
a21 a22 / a2n
« « «
am1 am2 / amn
1CCA :
4.1. Mixed strategy
Consider the game G with no saddle point, i.e., max
i
fmin
j
aijgs
min
j
fmax
i
aijg. To solve these games, Neumann [25] introduced the
concept of mixed strategy in classical form.We denote the sets of all
mixed strategies, which are referred to as strategy spaces, that are
available for players I and II by
SІ ¼
(
x ¼ ðx1; x2;…; xmÞ2<mþ
i ¼ 1;2;…;m and Xm
i¼1
xi ¼ 1
)
;
SІІ ¼
8<:y ¼ ðy1; y2;…; ynÞ2<nþ
j ¼ 1;2;…;n and
Xn
j¼1
yj ¼ 1
9=;;
where <mþ denotes the mdimensional non-negative Euclidean
space. Thus, by a crisp two-person zero-sum matrix game G, we
indicate the triplet G¼ (SI, SII, A). As each player is uncertain about
which strategy he/she will choose, he/she will choose a probability
distribution over the set of alternatives that are available to him/her
or a mixed strategy in terms of game theory.
4.2. Matrix games with I-fuzzy goals and I-fuzzy pay-offs
Let SІ; SІІ be the strategy spaces for player I and player II,
respectively, and let ~A ¼ (~aij)mn be the pay-off matrix, where each
~aij ¼ hðaijl; aij; aijrÞ;waij ;uaij iði ¼ 1;2;…m; j ¼ 1;2;…nÞ is the TIFN
deﬁned in Section 2.2. Let ~v and ~w be two TIFNs that represent the
aspiration levels of player I and player II, respectively. Then, a two-
person zero-sum matrix game with I-fuzzy goals and I-fuzzy pay-
offs, as deﬁned by the triplet ðSІ; SІІ; ~A; ~v;dI:F~p;~q; ~w;7
I:F
~r;~s
Þ, where
dI:F
~p;~q
and7I:F
~r;~s
; are explained in Section 3.2 and ~p, ~q, and ~r; ~s are the
adequacies/tolerance levels for player I and player II, respectively.
In the following deﬁnition, we refer to a two-person zero-sum
matrix game with I-fuzzy goals and I-fuzzy pay-offs as an intui-
tionistic fuzzy matrix game denoted by fIFG.
The solution concept of fIFG is deﬁned as follows:
Definition 9. A point (bx,by)2SІ  SІІ is referred to as a solution of
the IF matrix game fIFG if
(i) bxT ~AydI:F
~p;~q
~v; for all y2 SІІ and
(ii) xT ~Aby7I:F
~r;~s
~w; for all x2 SІ.
Using this deﬁnition and employing a resolution procedure for
the double I-fuzzy constraints proposed in Section 3, we can
construct the following pair of I-fuzzy linear programming prob-
lems for player I and player II, respectively.
Subject to
maxfx1  h1g
xT ~AydI:Ff~v ~pð1 x1Þg for all y2SІІ;
xT ~AydI:Ff~v ~pþ ~qð1 h1Þg for all y2SІІ;
x2SI;
x1  h1; x1 þ h1  1;
x; x1;h1  0
(11)
and
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maxfx2  h2g
xT ~Ay7I:Ff ~wþ ~rð1 x2Þg for all x2SI;
xT ~Ay7I:Ff ~wþ ~r  ~sð1 h2Þg for all x2SI;
y2SII;
x2  h2; x2 þ h2  1;
y; x2; h2  0
(12)
wheredI:F and7I:F are the relations between two TIFNs. As SI and
SII are convex polytopes, only the extreme points of the sets SI and
SII are considered in the constraint conditions of equations (11) and
(12). Therefore, these problems will be converted as
Subject to
maxfx1  h1g
xT ~Ajd
I:F
n
~v ~pjð1 x1Þ
o
ðj ¼ 1;2; :::;nÞ;
xT ~Ajd
I:F
n
~v ~pj
	
þ ~qjð1 h1Þ
o
ðj ¼ 1;2; :::;nÞ;Pm
i¼1
xi ¼ 1;
x1  h1; x1 þ h1  1;
x; x1;h1  0
(13)
and
Subject to
maxfx2  h2g
xT ~Ai y7
I:Ff ~wþ ~rið1 x2Þgði ¼ 1;2; :::;mÞ;
xT ~Ai y7
I:Ffð ~wþ ~riÞ  ~sið1 h2Þgði ¼ 1;2; :::;mÞ;Pn
j¼1
yj ¼ 1
x2  h2; x2 þ h2  1;
y; x2;h2  0
(14)Subject to
maxfx1  h1gPm
i¼1

Fl


~aij

xi  Flð~yÞ  Fl

~pj
	
ð1 x1Þðj ¼ 1;2; :::;nÞ;Pm
i¼1

Fl


~aij

xi  Flð~yÞ  Fl

~pj
	
þ Fl

~qj
	
ð1 h1Þðj ¼ 1;2; :::;nÞ;Pm
i¼1
xi ¼ 1
x1  h1; x1 þ h1  1;
x; x1;h1  0
(17)
andSubject to
maxfx2  h2gPn
j¼1

Fl


~aij

yj  Flð ~wÞ þ Flð~riÞð1 x2Þði ¼ 1;2; :::;mÞ;Pn
j¼1

Fl


~aij

yj  Flð ~wÞ þ Flð~riÞ  Fl

~Si
	
ð1 h2Þði ¼ 1;2; :::;mÞ;Pn
j¼1
yj ¼ 1
x2  h2; x2 þ h2  1;
y; x2;h2  0
(18)where ~Ai (~Aj) denotes the ith row (jth column) of ~A (i ¼ 1,2, …,m;
j ¼ 1,2, …,n). By utilizing the ranking function Fl: ~F /<(l2[0,1])
(deﬁned in Section 2.2, Deﬁnition 8), which preserves the ranking
when I-fuzzy numbers are multiplied by non-negative scalars,these problems can be transformed into linear programming
problems as
Subjectto
maxfx1h1g
Fl

~A
	
j
xFlð~yÞFl

~pj
	
ð1x1Þðj¼1;2;:::;nÞ;
Fl

~A
	
j
xFlð~yÞFl

~pj
	
þFl

~qj
	
ð1h1Þðj¼1;2;:::;nÞ;Pm
i¼1
xi¼1
x1h1;x1þh11;
x;x1;h10
(15)
and
Subject to
maxfx2h2g
Fl

~A
	
j
yFlð ~wÞþFl


~rj
ð1x2Þði¼1;2; :::;mÞ;
Fl

~A
	
j
yFlð ~wÞþFl


~rj
Fl~Sj	ð1h2Þði¼1;2; :::;mÞ;Pn
j¼1
yi¼1
x2h2;x2þh21;
y;x2;h20
(16)
Here Fl(~A)i (Fl(~A)j) denotes the ith row (jth column) of Fl(~A), where
i ¼ 1,2,…,m and j ¼ 1,2,…,n.
The two linear programming problems (15) and (16) can be
written asTo solve the I-fuzzy matrix game gIFG, we have to solve the
crisp linear programming problems (17) and (18) for player I and
player II, respectively. If (bx,bx1,bh1) is an optimal solution of (17),
then bx is an optimal strategy for player I, bx1 is the minimal
M.R. Seikh et al. / Paciﬁc Science Review A: Natural Science and Engineering 18 (2016) 5e13 11degree of acceptance and bh1 is the maximal degree of rejection to
the aspiration level ~v of player I. A similar interpretation can also
be given to the optimal solution (by , bx2, bh2) of problem (18). The
results discussed in this section are summarized in the following
theorem.~p1 ¼ ~p2 ¼ ~p ¼ 〈ð14; 16; 20Þ; 0:6; 0:2〉; ~q1 ¼ ~q2 ¼ ~q ¼ 〈ð10;12;16Þ;0:6;0:2〉 and
~r1 ¼ ~r2 ¼ ~r〈ð13; 15; 22Þ; 0:6; 0:2〉; also ~s1 ¼ ~s2 ¼ ~s ¼ 〈ð9; 11; 18Þ; 0:6; 0:2〉:Theorem 1. The I-fuzzy matrix game fIFG described byfIFG ¼(SІ ; SІ І ; ~A; ~v;dI:F~p;~q; ~w;7I:F~r;~sÞ is equivalent to the two crisp linear
programming problems (17) and (18), which can be easily solved by
the simplex method.Vlða11Þ ¼ 108:5þ 36:16l Alða11Þ ¼ 4el Flða11Þ ¼ 104:5þ 37:16l
Vlða12Þ ¼ 93:2þ 31:06l Alða12Þ ¼ 2:13 0:53l Flða12Þ ¼ 91:07þ 31:59l
Vlða21Þ ¼ 54þ 18l Alða21Þ ¼ 5:33 1:33l Flða21Þ ¼ 48:67þ 19:33l
Vlða22Þ ¼ 108:5þ 36:16l Alða22Þ ¼ 4el Flða22Þ ¼ 104:5þ 37:16l5. Application to voting share problem
In this section, a voting share problem in a particular region is
considered to demonstrate the application of the proposed
methodology.
Assume that the two major political parties P1 and P2
participate in a parliamentary constituency election in a
particular region. Let the secretaries of both the parties P1 and
P2 aim to enhance their expected votes under the circumstance
that the total number of voters in that region is ﬁxed. The
voting share percentage of one party increases while the voting
share percentage of another party decreases. Assume that the
secretaries of both parties are rational, i.e., they will choose
optimal strategies to maximize their expected votes without co-
operation. Assume that P1 has two strategies to increase their
voting share: strategy ε1 (campaigning by media), and ε2
(campaigning by hosting rallies). Let P2 possess the same
strategies as P1. This problem may be regarded as a matrix
game, namely, the parties P1 and P2 are regarded as player I
and player II, respectively. They may use strategies ε1 and ε2.
Due to a lack of information or imprecise available information,
the secretaries of the two parties are usually not able to pre-
cisely forecast the voting percentage. They estimate the voting
percentage with a certain degree of conﬁdence but they may
hesitate regarding the estimation of expected votes. To address
the uncertainty, TIFNs are employed to express the voting share
for a particular political party. The pay-off matrix ~A for both the
parties is expressed as~A ¼ campaigning by media
hosting rallies
0B@ 〈ð175;180;190Þ;0:6;0:2〉〈ð80;90;100Þ;0:6;0:2〉
campaigningbymedia
〈ð150;156;158Þ; 0:6;0:2〉
〈ð175;180;190Þ; 0:6;0:2〉
hosting rallies
1CA
Vlð~vÞ ¼ 102þ 34l Alð~vÞ ¼ 5:33 1:33l Flð~vÞ ¼ 96:67þ 35:33l
Vlð~wÞ ¼ 95þ 31:67l Alð ~wÞ ¼ 5:33 1:33l Flð ~wÞ ¼ 89:67þ 33l
Vlð~pÞ ¼ 9:8þ 3:3l Alð~pÞ ¼ 1:6 0:4l Flð~pÞ ¼ 8:2þ 3:7l
Vlð~qÞ ¼ 7:4þ 2:5l Alð~qÞ ¼ 1:6 0:4l Flð~qÞ ¼ 5:8þ 2:9l
Vlð~rÞ ¼ 9:5þ 3:2l Alð~rÞ ¼ 2:4 0:6l Flð~rÞ ¼ 7:1þ 3:7l
Vlð~sÞ ¼ 7:1þ 2:36l Alð~sÞ ¼ 2:4 0:6l Flð~sÞ ¼ 4:7þ 2:96lwhere 〈ð175; 180; 190Þ; 0:6; 0:2〉 in the matrix ~A is a TIFN,
which indicates that the expected votes in favour of P1 is
“approximately 180” when parties P1 and P2 simultaneously
apply the strategy ε1 (campaigning by media). The maximum
degree of conﬁdence of the secretary is 0.6, whereas the min-
imum degree of non-conﬁdence is 0.2. His/her degree of hesi-
tation is 0.2. Other elements in the matrix ~A are similarly
explained.
We assume that the aspiration levels for player I and player II are~v ¼ 〈ð160;170;180Þ;0:6;0:2〉 and ~w
¼ 〈ð145;160;165Þ;0:6;0:2〉:
The tolerance levels for player I and player II areThe value indexes and ambiguity indexes of
~aij ¼ hðaijl; aij; aijrÞ;waij ; uaij i ði ¼ 1;2; j ¼ 1;2Þ can be obtained as
follows:
Vl


aij
 ¼ lDv
~aijþ ð1 lÞDm
~aij
¼ aijl þ 4aij þ aijr
6

waij þ l


1waij  uaij
 
and
Al


~aij
 ¼ lEm
~aijþ ð1 lÞEm
~aij
¼ aijr  aijl
3


1 uaij
 l
1waij  uaij
Additionally,
Fl


~aij
 ¼ Vl
~aij Al
~aij
Therefore,and similarly,
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models for players I and II are obtained as follows:Subject to
maxfx1  h1g
ð104:5þ 37:16lÞx1 þ ð48:67þ 19:33lÞx2  ð96:67þ 35:33lÞ  ð8:2þ 3:7lÞð1 x1Þ
ð91:07þ 31:59lÞx1 þ ð104:5þ 37:16lÞx2  ð96:67þ 35:33lÞ  ð8:2þ 3:7lÞð1 x1Þ
ð104:5þ 37:16lÞx1 þ ð48:67þ 19:33lÞx2  ð96:67þ 35:33lÞ  ð8:2þ 3:7lÞ þ ð5:8þ 2:9lÞð1 h1Þ
ð91:07þ 31:59lÞx1 þ ð104:5þ 37:16lÞx2  ð96:67þ 35:33lÞ  ð8:2þ 3:7lÞ þ ð5:8þ 2:9lÞð1 h1Þ
x1 þ x2 ¼ 1
x1  h1
x1 þ h1  1
x1; x2; x1; h1  0
(19)andSubject to
max fx2  h2g
ð104:5þ 37:16lÞy1 þ ð91:07þ 31:59lÞy2  ð89:67þ 33lÞ þ ð7:1þ 3:76lÞð1 x2Þ
ð48:67þ 19:33lÞy1 þ ð104:5þ 37:16lÞy2  ð89:67þ 33lÞ þ ð7:1þ 3:76lÞð1 x2Þ
ð104:5þ 37:16lÞy1 þ ð91:07þ 31:59lÞy2  ð89:67þ 33lÞ þ ð7:1þ 3:76lÞ  ð4:7þ 2:96lÞð1 h2Þ
ð48:67þ 19:33lÞy1 þ ð104:5þ 37:16lÞy2  ð89:67þ 33lÞ þ ð7:1þ 3:76lÞ  ð4:7þ 2:96lÞð1 h2Þ
y1 þ y2 ¼ 1
x2  h2
x2 þ h2  1
y1; y2; x2; h2  0
(20)Solving (19) and (20) with the help of LINGO software, we ob-
tained the optimal strategies for players I and II for differ-
entl2½0;1, as depicted in Table 1.
As shown in Table 1, for different l 2 [0, 1], different optimal
strategies can be obtained for the players. For l ¼ 1/2, the optimal
solution for player I is
~x ¼ ð0:7997;0:2003ÞT and ~x1 ¼ 0:5799; ~h1
¼ 0:1962; and the optimal solution for player II is ~y
¼ ð0:2003;0:7997ÞT and ~x2 ¼ 0:5609; ~h2 ¼ 0:1835:
Therefore, the optimal strategy for player I is (0.7997, 0.2003)T, and
the aspiration level ~v is accepted with a minimal degree 0.5799 and
rejected with a maximal degree 0.1962. Note that the sum of two
optimal degrees is not 1. A degree of hesitation ofTable 1
Optimal strategies for players I and II for different values of l.
L bx 1 bx 2 bx 1 bh1
0.0 0.8061 0.1939 0.6346 0.1027
0.1 0.8047 0.1953 0.6217 0.1250
0.2 0.8033 0.1967 0.6099 0.1453
0.3 0.8020 0.1980 0.5990 0.1637
0.4 0.8008 0.1992 0.5890 0.1806
0.5 0.7997 0.2003 0.5799 0.1962
0.6 0.7987 0.2013 0.5713 0.2104
0.7 0.7977 0.2023 0.5633 0.2237
0.8 0.7967 0.2033 0.5559 0.2359
0.9 0.7958 0.2042 0.5490 0.2473
1.0 0.7949 0.2051 0.5425 0.25791  bx1  bh1 ¼ 0.2239 is obtained. A similar interpretation can be
given for player II.6. Conclusions
In this paper, matrix games with I-fuzzy goals and the pay-offs
represented by TIFNs are explored. A solution methodology is
proposed to solve these games. First, the concept of double I-fuzzy
inequality constraints is interpretedwith regard to aspiration levels
and adequacies. Second, a defuzziﬁcation function (ranking func-
tion) is deﬁned based on the value index and ambiguity index of
TIFNs. A pair of I-fuzzy programming models is established for two
players. Based on the resolution method of double I-fuzzy con-
straints and by applying the ranking functions, these two models
are transformed into two crisp linear programmingmodels that can
be solved by a simplex method to obtain the optimal strategies. The
numerical example indicates that the optimal strategies for both
players are dependent on their subjective preference information.
The main advantage of this method is that it provides not only
the degree of acceptance but also the degree of rejection of theby 1 by 2 bx 2 bh 2
0.1939 0.8061 0.4360 0.3399
0.1953 0.8047 0.4661 0.3011
0.1967 0.8033 0.4932 0.2667
0.1980 0.8020 0.5179 0.2360
0.1992 0.8008 0.5403 0.2084
0.2003 0.7997 0.5609 0.1835
0.2013 0.7987 0.5798 0.1609
0.2023 0.7977 0.5972 0.1404
0.2033 0.7967 0.6133 0.8000
0.2042 0.7958 0.6282 0.1042
0.2051 0.7949 0.6421 0.0883
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this paper differs from the proposed methodology of Nan et al.
[19,20], Seikh et al. [31,34,36], Aggarwal et al. [1], Bandyopadhyay
et al. [7] and Li et al. [15], as they employed an IFS to express goals
or only considered pay-offs as I-fuzzy numbers. However, neither of
these studies include I-fuzzy inequalities in their models with the
pay-offs that are represented by I-fuzzy numbers. In our method-
ology, the inequalities are I-fuzzy, whereas the pay-offs are also
described by I-fuzzy numbers.
The major limitation of this proposed methodology is that it is
dependent on the ranking function. Different types of ranking
functions yield different types of solution. A more general meth-
odology will be investigated in the future.
Although the proposed method is illustrated with the voting
share problem, it can be applied in decision-making theory in areas
such as economics, operations research, management, and war
science.
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